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Abstract
Fisman and Love reexamine  the role  of financial  market  important role in allowing  firms to take advantage of
development  in the intersectoral  allocation  of resources.  global growth opportunities. These results are
First,  they characterize  the assumptions underlying  particularly  strong when financial development  takes
previous work in  this area, in particular, that of Rajan  into account both the level and composition of financial
and Zingales  (1998). The authors argue that Rajan  and  development:  private banking appears to play a
Zingales (1998)  implicitly test whether  financial  particularly  important role in resource  allocation.  The
intermediaries  allow firms to better respond  to global  authors' technique allows them to further  distinguish
shocks to growth opportunities. Second,  the authors  between the "growth opportunities"  hypothesis stated
propose  a more efficient alternative  test of this  above and the alternative  "finance and external
hypothesis using statistical techniques  developed in the  dependence"  hypothesis, which  implies that countries
social  networks literature. Specifically,  they find that  with similar levels  of financial development should
countries  have more highly correlated  growth rates  specialize  in similar sectors.  They do not find evidence  to
across sectors when they have well-developed  financial  support this alternative view  of finance and
markets,  suggesting that financial markets  play an  development.
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Khanma and Luigi Zingales  for extremely helpful conversations  and advice.Understanding  the determinants of industrial patterns of growth is one of the fundamental
issues in economic  development, and economics  generally.  While an entire literature has arisen
to  examine the  determinants  of the level of economic  growth,'  relatively  little  time  has been
spent  in  understanding  the  sectoral  composition of growth.  To  the  extent  that  the  efficient
allocation  of  resources  across  sectors  is  important  for  the  ultimate  goal  of  promoting
development,  the  forces  that  drive  industrial  patterns  of growth  may  be  a  very  important
intermediating  factor  in  driving  growth.  Hence,  understanding  these patterns  is important  for
both the theory and practice of economics.
Earlier work  in development  economics,  primarily by Hollis  Chenery,  did examine the
allocation of resources  across sectors in countries at different stages of economic  development.2
Chenery's basic hypothesis  was that countries at similar levels of economic development should
have similar patterns of intersectoral allocation.  More recently,  Rajan and Zingales (1998) have
revisited  the  topic of intersectoral  allocation,  focusing  on the  role of finance.  The  idea,  that
financial  institutions  play an important  role in the resource  allocation process,  dates back to  at
least Schumpeter (1912),  who conjectured  that banks  help to  identify entrepreneurs  with  good
growth  prospects,  and  therefore  help  to  reallocate  resources  to  their  most  productive  uses.
Therefore,  well-developed  financial  institutions  will  be  crucial  to  an  efficient  allocation  of
resources, in response  to  growth opportunities.  The difficulty in testing this hypothesis  is that
growth opportunities are not generally observable  to the econometrician:  a firm (or industry, or
country)  may not be growing because  there  are  no  growth opportunities,  or because  there  are
opportunities, but no financing to allocate resources to them.
l See Barro (1997)  for a comnprehensive review of the literature.
2 See Chenery (1960) and Chenery and Taylor (1968); Chenery and Syrquin (1992) provides  a summary and
restatement of this work.
2In this paper,  we present  an indirect approach  to testing this hypothesis  that circumvents
the need to  measure  these opportunities  directly..  More precisely,  we  assume  that there  exist
industry-specific  global shocks to growth opportunities, either due to demand shocks or changes
in factor prices.  While we never observe  these shocks, we claim that they create similarities  in
growth  opportunities  across  countries.  The  'finance  and  growth  opportunities'  hypothesis
described  above  implies  that in order  to respond  to  these  shocks,  a  country  must  have well-
developed  financial  markets;  therefore,  we  should observe  correlated  patterns of intra-industry
growth  rates among  countries  with well-developed  financial markets,  as  they respond to  these
(unobserved)  shocks.
To preview  our methodology  and results:  we consider  the correlations  in intra-industry
growth rates across country pairs during the  1980s.3 Our identifying  assumption is that  global
shocks to growth opportunities  should result in a correlation across countries  in sectoral  growth
rates,  as resources  are  reallocated  from lower  growth opportunity  industries  to  higher growth
opportunity  industries.  However,  if this reallocation process  requires  well-developed  financial
institutions, then a pair of countries will only have correlated growth rates if they both have well-
developed  financial  markets.  We  find  evidence  in  support  of  this  'finance  and  growth
opportunities'  hypothesis.
Furthermore,  we consider a hypothesis  closely related to that of Chenery's,  namely  that
countries  at  similar  levels  of per capita  income  should  have  correlated  patterns  of industrial
growth.  We  find very  strong support  for this hypothesis  in the  data.  This implies  that growth
opportunities may be more similar in countries at similar levels of development,  and suggests an
additional test of our 'finance  and growth opportunities'  hypothesis:  To the extent that financial
3 A similar  approach utilizing pairwise correlations has been utilized in the past by sociologists examining  social
networks, and more recently, has been applied to the field of corporate strategy.  In particular, Khanna and Rivkin
(2001) use this approach to look at the related topic of patterns of profitability across countries.
3institutions  allow  firms to take advantage  of these opportunities,  financial  development  should
lead  to  more  correlated  growth  rates  for  countries  at  more  similar  levels  of  industrial
development  (and  hence  with  similar  growth  opportunities  across  industries).  We  also  find
support for this additional hypothesis in the data.
To summarize,  while we never actually observe  growth opportunities,  we are  able to test
the  finance  and  growth  hypothesis  by  looking  at  commonalities and  differences  in  growth
opportunities.  We find support for the finance  and growth hypothesis, primarily when  the level
of financial  development  is  measured  as  domestic  credit  provided  by private  sector  banking
institutions.
Our work is closely related to that of Rajan and Zingales (1998),4 who also develop a test
for the  'finance  and growth'  hypothesis  described  above.  They deal with the non-observability
of growth  opportunities  by  assuming  that  there  are  certain  industries  that  are  'financially
dependent,'  and hence  have  a  greater  need  for  outside  financing.  They  find  that  financially
dependent firms grow relatively quickly in countries with well-developed  financial markets. This
suggests that poor financial  markets may distort the growth process, causing 'too few'  resources
to be allocated  to industries  that are dependent  on outside financing.  However,  they make the
strong  assumption  that  some  industries  have  an  inherent  need  for  outside  financing  that  is
constant across countries, and that the level of outside financing of U.S. firms could be used as a
proxy for this need in other countries.
Another  contribution  of our  paper  is  to  clarify  the theoretical  underpinnings  of RZ's
approach,  and to  show that it is,  effectively,  a special  case of our framework.  RZ argue  that
there  exist industries  that,  due to  high upfront  capital  costs  or long  gestation periods  have  an
inherent need for outside financing.  Countries with poorly developed  financial markets  will not
4 Henceforth referred to as RZ.
4be  able  to take  advantage  of opportunities  in  'financially  dependent'  industries,  implying  that
these  countries will devote resources to industries with a low level of financial dependence.  We
argue that this assumption leads  to the hypothesis that countries  with similar levels of financial
development  grow  in  similar  industries,  which  we  refer  to  as  the  'finance  and  external
dependence  hypothesis.'  This yields  a different prediction  from our previous hypothesis  on the
correlation  of intra-industry  growth  across countries.  We show  that RZ's methodology  cannot
differentiate  between  these  separate  hypotheses,  i.e.  the  'finance  and  growth  opportunities'
hypothesis described above, and the 'finance and external dependence'  hypothesis implied by the
financial  dependence  assumption,  while  our  more  general  approach  does  allow  for  a more
refined  test.  We  reject  the  'financial  dependence'  hypothesis  in  favor  of  the  'growth
opportunities'  hypothesis.
While our work is tied most closely that of Rajan and Zingales (1998), this paper fits into
the more  general  literature  on the role of financial  development  in the  growth  process.  This
literature began with Goldsmith  (1969),  and has been  followed by the empirical  work of King
and  Levine  (1993),  and  more  recently  by Demirguc-Kunt  and  Maksimovic  (1998),  Wurgler
(2000), Love (2002) and others.
Our paper is also related to the strand of literature that focuses on disaggregating  growth
rates into country-, time-, and  sector-specific  components.5 These papers look at the percent of
the  total  variation  in  growth  rates  that  each  of the  components  can  explain,  rather  than  the
5  The identification of components in these studies is based on the temporal dimension in growth rates.  By
estimating the error-components models,  the country- and industry- fixed effects, which are referred to as long-run
trends, are identified, along with the short-term deviations from these trends. See for example, Stockman (1988) and
Costello (1997) use variance-decomposition  to investigate the sources of  disturbances to the growth rates. The
former studies 7 European countries and the US and finds that both industry and country-specific  shocks have
simnilar effects and the latter studies 5 major industries in 6 OECD countries and finds that the short-run productivity
growth has strong country-specific component and little industry-specific  component.  Bayouni  and Prasad (1997)
study co-movement in sectoral  growth at 1-digit level across eight US regions and eight European countries and
find that both areas have similar aggregate disturbances.  Loayza, Lopes and Ubide (2001) add a study of developing
countries to the literature  and find significant co-movement in East Asia and Europe but not in Latin America.
5underlying factors  that  cause  these  components  to  vary.  Our  focus  is  on understanding  the
underlying determinants of industry co-movement.6
The rest of this paper is organized  as  follows: in Section  1, we describe  our theoretical
framework  and methodology  in greater detail.  In Section 2 we describe  our data. In section 3.1
we  show  the  results  in  support of our argument  that dependence  on external  finance  may be
proxying  for growth  opportunities in the work of RZ. In section 3.2 we introduce  our pairwise
comparison  methodology  with  a  motivating  application,  and  present  our  basic  results  on
similarity in income and similarity in subsequent growth.  In Section 3.3, we examine the role of
financial development  in mediating  a country's  ability to take advantage  of common shocks  to
growth opportunities.  In section  3.4  we consider  an  alternative  theory of finance  and sectoral
allocation, and test for its validity. Finally, we conclude in section 4.
1.  Financial Development and Growth: Theory
There  has  been  extensive  theoretical  work  on  the  effects  of financial  development  on  real
economic  activity.  The primary  function of financial  systems,  according  to this literature,  is to
facilitate the allocation of resources across space  and time in an uncertain  environment (Merton
and Bodie,  1995).  In performing  this  function,  financial  institutions  play an important  role in
identifying  investment opportunities, mobilizing  savings,  facilitating trading and diversification
of risk and improving  corporate  governance mechanisms  (Levine,  1997).  This allocative role of
financial institutions was recognized by Schumpeter (1911), who  conjectured that banks help to
6 A few other distinctions  are noteworthy.  Since we are using a correlation coefficient  as a measure of  co-
movement, the country-level components are differenced out, i.e. our correlation measure is not affected by average
country-level growth rates. Similarly, we abstract from the temporal dimension by using average growth rates for
the decade of 1980-1990.  Finally, unlike previous papers that studied aggregate sectors (primary, manufacturing,
agriculture), we focus on 37 disaggregated industries within the-manufacturing  sector.
6identify entrepreneurs  with  good growth prospects, and therefore help to reallocate resources  to
their most productive uses.
The difficulty in testing whether  financial  development helps  the allocation of resources
to the best growth opportunities, as noted in the introduction, is that growth opportunities are not
generally observable to the econometrician:  a firm (or industry, or country) may be not growing
because there are no growth opportunities, or because  there are opportunities, but no financing to
allocate  resources  to  them.  In  the  latter  case,  the  availability  of  financing,  i.e.,  "financing
constraints,"  will affect  the relationship  between  actual  (realized)  growth  and potential growth
(i.e.  growth opportunities).  More  formally,  we write the  relationship  between  potential  growth
opportunities  GO  and  actual growth  as a function of the degree of financing constraints,  which
we denote  FC  (note  that the  asterisk  emphasizes  that these  variables  are  unobservable).  For
simplicity of exposition,  we  assume that  the  degree  of financing constraints  is measured  as  a
percent  of desired  external  financing  that the  firm  can  actually  raise  in the  financial  markets.
Thus,  actual  growth  will be  a  function  of growth  opportunities  (i.e.  the potential  increase  in
production or value added) times the percent of desired financing the firm was able to obtain:
(1)  Actual Growthi,  =  PGO*ic  *FC*j,
The  subscripts  above  emphasize  that  for  each  firm  or  industry  i,  in  a  country  c,  growth
opportunities  will  be  industry and  country  specific  (the  time  dimension  is  suppressed  for the
notational  simplicity).  The hypothesis  that financial  development  loosens financing constraints,
and therefore  allows firms or industries to invest according to their growth opportunities, implies
that FC*iC = f(FDj)  + Ecc,  where f'  >O, in other words, in countries with higher FD firms are able
7to  obtain a larger portion of their optimal (desired)  level of financing.  Thus, the test of whether
financial  development  improves  the  allocation  of  capital  will  be  a  test  whether  financial
development reduces the  financing constraints and therefore  allows firms or industries to invest
according to their growth opportunities.  Substituting for FC in (1), and assuming for simplicity a
linear relationship between FC and financial development, we may rewrite (1)  as:
(2)  (Actual)  Growthic =  ,BGO  ic  *FDc +e j,
The obvious  problem in testing  the above relationship  is the  need to  measure  GO,  which are
unobservable.  Because we cannot  actually measure growth opportunities directly;  our approach
will  be to  assume that there  exist  global industry-specific  shocks  to growth  opportunities,  i.e.,
some component of GO*i,  is  common across countries:
(3)  GO  ic  =  j  + Eic
Combining (2) and (3), we  obtain a general expression for the correlation of growth in industry i
in countries c and d:
(4)  Corr(GrowthiC,Growthid)  = a *f(FIc, FDd) +  Ecd
where j.)  is a transformation  of (FDC,  FDd),  or some other pair of country-level  characteristics,
(Xc,Xd) into a scalar.  Intuitively, if both countries have a high degree of financial development,
this  correlation  should be high,  as both countries  in a pair take  advantage  of m*.  However,  if
8either member of the pair is not financially developed, there will be little comovement, as at least
one country will not be responding to no.  In the next section, we discuss possible definitions of
f(.), including one that captures the above intuition.
Minimum vs. Distance  measures
We focus on two ways of defining the function f(.)  in equation (4) that aggregate the information
on country-level variables for two countries.  As suggested above, for testing our model it will be
important to have a measure of whether both countries  in a pair are at a high level of financial
development.  Thus, we need a metric that takes on a high value only when both countries have a
high level of X. This is best represented by a minimum metric, i.e. Min(XC,  Xd). We refer to this
metric  as  a measure  of high development of both countries.  It will  also be  useful  to  have  a
measure of the absolute distance between two indicators, Distance = I  Xc  - Xd 1.  This metric will
be smaller  for countries  that are more similar to  each other in their levels of the variable X in
question.  For example, two countries  that have high income levels will have a small distance, as
well as two countries that both have low levels of income; we therefore refer to this metric  as a
measure of similarity  between two countries.
Figure  1 illustrates  the  distinction  between  these  two  measures.  For  example,  if the
coefficient a  in (4) is negative,  it implies that for the distance measure the correlation is high in
two  quadrants  (Low/Low  and  High/High).  For  the  Minimum  measure,  if a  is  positive  this
implies that the correlation will be high only in the High/High quadrant.
An important benefit of our pairwise comparison methodology,  in addition to utilizing all
the data available,  is the ability to distinguish between these two different metrics. For example,
the  two  hypotheses  we  are  interested  in  are:  first,  whether  countries  with  high  financial
9development  are  growing  in similar  industries  (i.e.  minimum  measure)  and  second,  whether
countries that have a similar level of financial  development are growing in similar industries (i.e.
distance  measure).  We will see below  that in the framework of Rajan and Zingales (1998),  it is
impossible to distinguish between these two hypotheses.
Comparison  with Earlier  Work: Analysis of the Model of Rajan and Zingales
A recent paper by Rajan  and Zingales  (1998)  has developed  an alternative  approach  to testing
whether financial  development has an effect  on the allocation of resources.  We now consider
carefully the theoretical underpinnings of their model, and how it relates to our approach.  Rajan
and Zingales hypothesize that some industries have an inherent need for outside financing due to
a "technological"  demand for external  financing,  these industries  are referred to as  "financially
dependent".  If financial  development  reduces  the  cost of external  finance,  such  industries will
have a relative advantage  in countries with well-developed financial markets.  RZ implement this
model using the following functional form:
(5)  Growthic = c*(FDc)*EXTFINusi  +  ej,
where EXTFINus;  is industry i's need for outside financing,  which was measured using the US
data (we have emphasized this assumption by adding the subscript US; note that their model also
includes industry and country dummies which we omit for simplicity of notation).
To understand  how this model relates to the model  given  in (1)  we need  to distinguish
between  the  desired  amount  of external  finance,  which we  will refer  to  as Need  (where  the
asterisk  again indicates  that this  desired  level is  unobservable  to  the econometrician)  and the
actual  level  of extemal  finance,  which  is  the  EXTFIN  measure  used  by  RZ.  If the  firm  is
10financially  constrained  it  will  only  be  able  to  obtain  some  percent  of its  desired  external
financing,  so that:
(6)  EXTFIN ic = Need*ic  *FC*ic  +  Eic
The final  issue is to understand what is meant by Need*.  We argue that outside financing
requirements  are driven,  at least  in part, by growth prospects.  RZ define  EXTFIN as  the gap
between cash flows  and investment for firms in the United States: industries with large values of
EXTFIN will be those with high expected future demand, and hence a need to invest in capacity
expansion  beyond  that  which  can  be  financed  with current  cash flow.  Hence,  industries  that
require  outside  financing  are  likely  to be  growing  industries.  Therefore  we  argue  that  there
exists a relationship between desired external  finance and growth prospects, given by:
(7)  Needic  =  a*gi (GO*)  + Eic
We  provide  a  simple  model  to  illustrate  this  relationiship  in the  Appendix.  The  function  gj(.)
transforms  growth  opportunities  into  the  desired  level  of investment,  which  depends  on  the
functional  form  of the firm's production  function.  The function  gio  is allowed  to  be industry-
specific  to  account  for  industry-differences  in  upfront  costs,  gestation  periods  and  other
"technological  differences"  that would affect the demand for external  finance,  as argued by RZ.
In other words, our model in (7) incorporates the "industry-specificity"  assumption of RZ, while
emphasizing that the main driving force for the differences in external financing requirements is
the presence of growth opportunities. Substituting (7) into (6) we obtain:
11(8)  EXTFIN ic  =  a*g1 (GOJ  j)  * FC*jr,
Thus, the  actual  amount of external  finance  is a function of (unobserved)  growth opportunities
and  the degree  of financing  constraints.  RZ  argue  that  since  US  financial  markets  are  well
developed,  the fraction  of desired finance that (large  publicly-traded)  firms are able to obtain is
close to one, i.e. FC&ius=l,  which allows them to use actual external finance (EXTFIN)  for these
firms  as  a substitute  for  desired  external  finance  (Need).  Maintaining  this  assumption,  and
substituting (8) into (5), we find that the RZ model can be written as:
(9)  Growthic = c*gi (GO*usi) * FDc  + sic
Note that this model  is almost identical  to the model in (2) except that growth opportunities  are
given by growth opportunities  in the US. By comparing  (1)  and (8) we observe that both actual
growth  and  the  actual  usage  of external  finance  are  functions  of growth  opportunities  and
financing  constraints.  Therefore,  under the assumption that FC*=l  for U.S.  firms, both can  be
used as proxies  for growth opportunities.  To test for this possibility, we re-estimate model  (5),
using actual growth in the US, Growthusi instead of EXTFIN,  i.e.:
(10)  Growthic = c*Growthusi  * FDc  +  ej,
We  find (see  section 3.1)  that statistically,  using actual U.S.  growth  outperforms  the EXTFIN
measure in the above regression, i.e. when both interactions are included simultaneously only the
interaction  with actual growth remains significant.  One implication  of this finding is-that actual
12growth  is a  less  noisy measure of growth  opportunities  than the  EXTFIN measure.7 Thus, we
claim that RZ are indeed testing model (2), but they use EXTFIN measured in the US as a proxy
for growth opportunities.  We further  claim that  actual sales  growth in the US  is another  (and
statistically better) measure of growth opportunities  in the US.
A natural question then arises as to whether growth  opportunities for an industry i in the
US are a reasonable proxy for the growth opportunities  in the same industry in a country c. This
will be  true if there  exist industry-specific  global  shocks to  growth  opportunities,  as  formally
described  in (3).  This observation leads  us to uncover another important implicit assumption  in
the RZ model.8 That is, to the extent that actual growth in the US is a proxy for common global
shocks, given by m1,  the RZ model is a valid test of model (2).9
The  preceding  discussion  suggests  that  RZ  are  effectively  testing  whether  rapidly
growing industries  in the U.S.  during the  1980's  are also growing  faster in countries  with more
developed  financial markets.  In other words, we argue that they compare growth in each country
c to growth in the US.  We argue below that models  (5) or (10) are not the best way to utilize all
the data available in the RZ dataset, and that their approach.  is a special case of the more general
framework given by (4). To see this, note that (10) can be rewritten as:
7One possible reason why actual growth is less noisy proxy for the growth opportunities becomes clear after
comparing equations (2) and (8)  - while actual growth is a linear function of growth opportunities, EXTFIN is a
non-linear function which depends on the functional  form of the inverse of the production function (i.e. transforming
growth into investment),  which is likely to introduce  extra noise in this measure.
Note that if the assumption of dependence on external  finance is taken literally (i.e. the same industry is equally
dependent on external finance  in all countries at all times), it would imnply that countries with a high level of
financial development should specialize in "high dependence"  industries  (i.e. these industries will be relatively more
developed in high FD countries), while countries with a low level of financial development  should specialize in
"low dependence"  industries. This is an interesting hypothesis, but testing it would require looking at industry
composition (rather than growth, as in RZ) as a function of financial development. To make the link between
"financial dependence" and growth they implicitly assume that there are common shocks to some industries and
therefore the shocks to "high dependence"  industries will translate into higher growth for these industries in
countries with a high level of financial development.
9 This is plausible assumption,  to the extent that the US may be considered to be a world leader in technology,  and
furthermore,  that some of these "shocks" may originate in the US and spread to the rest of the world.
13(11)  Growthic = Yc*Growth  USi  + sic,  where yc = c*FDc
Thus, the coefficient  yc is a function of financial  development in country c. Note that (11)  is in
fact a bivariate regression of Growthic on Growth usi  and the coefficient y,  estimated by OLS, is
given by:
(12)  yc = cov (Growthi  , Growth usi)/ a2
where  &  is  the  variance  of  Growth  Usi,  Equations  (11)  and  (12)  therefore  imply  that  an
alternative way of writing the model in (10) is:
(13)  cov (Growthi,  Growth ui) = c*FDc
In this formulation, the covariance  between the growth rates in country c and US growth
rates is a function of the level of financial  development in country  c. It is now clear that, under
this set of assumptions,  there is no reason to limit the comparison to the U.S.:  Our formulation
in (4) is a generalization of (13), which includes pairwise comparisons  across all country-pairs,
rather than limiting the analysis to pairwise comparisons with the U.S. only.
To  summarize  this section,  we argue  that the extemal  financial dependence  measure of
RZ is a proxy for growth opportunities  in the US,  and that actual growth is another altemative
measure of these growth opportunities.  We start in section 3.1  with presenting this result. Next,
we argue that the implicit driving force of the RZ model is the existence of global shocks to these
growth opportunities.  If this  is  the  case,  we  may more  effectively  analyze  whether  financial
14development allows firms to take advantage of growth opportunities by looking at the correlation
of industry growth rates for all country pairs, rather than using the US as a benchmark.  This is
the extended model that we implement in Section 3 below.
2. Data
Our data  are drawn  primarily  from  Rajan and Zingales  (1998),  and  described  in  detail  in that
paper.  For our comparison  with their work, the main outcome variable is real growth in valued
added, estimated for each of 37 industries  in 42 countries (UNCTAD,  1999).  We supplement the
RZ data with actual real  sales growth in the US, USGrowth,  which we calculate  using all firms
from Compustat (the same sample used by RZ to calculate EXTFIN).
To study the co-movement  in growth rates  across countries we calculate  the  correlation
of industry growth rates for each pair of countries  (c,d). We have total of (42*41)/2 of such pairs.
Table 2 shows the basic summary statistics. The average number of industries used in calculating
this  correlation is 26 because  not  all industries  are  available  for all countries.  The correlations
range from -0.65 to 0.8 with an average  of 0.096.  While the average level of correlation is quite
low, among  more similar countries,  it is considerably higher.  For example,  the average rate of
correlation between the United States and all other countries is 0.025; however, the correlation is
0.65  with  Canada  and  0.58  with  the  United  Kingdom.  To  give  the  reader  a  sense  of the
distribution of these correlations,  Figure 2 shows a histogram of their distribution.
We calculate  the distance and minimum metrics as discussed  above for our country-level
variables  of interest,  which include the level of income per capita,  several measures of financial
development  as discussed below, and a number of controls. A complete list of the variables used
15in this paper with the  original  sources  is  given in  the Table  1. Table  2 reports  the correlation
matrix for the main country-level measures.
Measures of  Financial  Development
We consider a number of measures of financial development.  As a first cut, we simply reuse the
measures of financial development from RZ.  As our main measures we use the two components
of FD separately: DOMCRED  (total domestic  credit deflated by GDP) and MCAP (stock market
capitalization  deflated by GDP).  Furthermore,  we take  advantage of new data  collected by La
Porta, Lopez de Silanes,  and  Shleifer (2001),1° on the ownership of banks around the world.  In
their work,  they look at the impact of government  ownership  on the level of development,  and
find that concentration of banking assets  in the hands of the government is negatively correlated
with subsequent  growth.  Their analyses  examine  the  level of growth;  however,  their theories
have further implications for resource allocation.  In particular,  they claim that government bank
ownership may result in politically expedient,  rather than  economically  efficient,  allocation of
resources.  Thus, resources  may be diverted  to  industries with political  clout rather  than those
with positive  growth opportunities." 1 This suggests  that both quality and quantity of financial
assets  need  to  be  considered.  Barth,  Caprio  and  Levine  (2000)  make  similar  arguments  in
claiming that greater state ownership  of banks is  associated with more poorly developed  banks
and non-bank financial  institutions.  This is also  consistent  with evidence  from  case studies:  for
example  Clarke  and  Cull  (1999)  find  that  public  banks  in Argentina  divert  a  much  larger
10Referred to henceforth as LLS
' One possibility,  which we are currently looking into, is  that govermnent-run banks may be more likely to allocate
resources to industries with past high levels of cash flow, which therefore have funds with which to bribe
government officials.  This would be tricky, because past cash flows are obviously correlated with future growth
opportunities.
16proportion  of resources  to primary production  and government  services than  do private banks,
and that public banks also have higher percentage of non-performing loans.
We  define  a variable,  GOVPCT70, which  gives  the proportion  of assets of a country's
top ten banking institutions that were held by the public banks in 1970 (see LLS, 2001  for a more
detailed  definition).  We  similarly  define  GOVPCT95.  Since  we  are  interested  primarily  in
government  ownership  of banks  during  the  1980's,  we  take  a  simple  average  of these  two
numbers  as our main measure of the concentration  of government  ownership  (GOVPCT).12 As
our main measure of banking assets, we define:
PRIVCRED = (1-  GOVPCT)*DOMCRED
This gives  an estimate of the  ratio of total privately provided credit to  GDP, and  incorporates
both elements of  banking asset quantity as well as quality.'3
3. Results
Before  presenting  our  main  results,  we  begin  in  Section  3.1  by briefly  presenting  a  set  of
regressions  based on an  augmented model  of RZ.  This will serve  as motivation  for the  more
12 Not surprisingly, the correlation of GOVPCT70 and GOVPCT95  is fairly high (p = 0.77).  Since most banking
privatizations took place during the '80s and '90s, GOVPCT70 perhaps deserves more weight.  None of our
regressions change substantially if we use GOVPCT70 in place of GOVPCT.
13 We also experimented  with other measures of financial development. Instead of total domestic  credit we have
used private credit, which is credit provided by depositary institutions to the private sector. We have similarly
looked at the product of private credit with percent of privately owned banks. Both measures produced virtually
identical results to the ones reported below. As alternative measures of stock market development  we used turnover
(value traded over market capitalization),  value traded over GDP and new equity issuance over GDP, obtained from
Deniirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001). As in the results reported below, no other alternative  measure of stock market
development produced  significant results.
17general approach utilized in Sections  3.2 - 3.4, and will further highlight the connection between
the our approach  and previous work.
3.1. Augmented  RZ model
In this  section  we  proceed  to  examine  whether RZ's measure  of external  financing  might be
simply proxying  for growth opportunities in the United States.  As discussed  above we use the
actual  sales growth  rate  in the  US,  USGrowth.  The  correlation  of USgrowth  and EXTFIN  is
0.69, (significant  at 1%) which is in line with our hypothesis that they are both related to growth
opportunities.
As  a preliminary  step, we replicate  the basic result of RZ in Table  3,  column  (1); here,
EXTFIN is the RZ measure of external financing, and FD is their standard measure of financial
development:  the sum of total domestic credit and stock market capitalization,  deflated by GDP.
We  reproduce  the  large  and  statistically  significant  coefficient  on  the  interaction  term
FD,*EXTFINj,  suggesting that firms in industries that require  external financing  grow relatively
faster in countries  at higher levels of financial  development.'4 Next, in model (2), we substitute
our measure  of growth  USGrowthi  for  EXTFIN  and  find  a  significantly  positive  coefficient.
Finally,  when  we  include  both  measures  in  the  regression  in  column  (3),  we  find  that  the
coefficient  on  FDc*EXTFINj  is  no  longer  significant,  and  is  'dominated'  by  the  heretofore
omitted  variable  FDc*USGrowthi.  This  provides  support  for  our  argument  in  section  1 that
14 We note that RZ and others have used accounting standards as an instrument  for financial development.  We do
not follow this approach for several reasons.  Most importantly, recent work in the accounting literature has brought
into question the legitimacy of using accounting as an instrument (see Francis  et al, 2001). Furthermore,  we find that
the significance of the accounting interaction term is highly dependent on the inclusion/exclusion  of the bottom tail
of the distribution.  Finally,  when we implement our more general 2-step technique, we do not find differences in
accounting standards to have any explanatory power.
18EXTFIN may be proxying for growth opportunities  in the US,  and that actual US  growth  is a
(statistically) better proxy for these opportunities.
3.2 Pairwise Correlations and similarity in Level of Development
We  start our pairwise  analysis with the hypothesis  that countries  at similar levels of per
capita income will have similar patterns of industrial growth. This hypothesis is closely related to
the  one  formalized  by  Chenery  (1960),  described  in  the  introduction.' 5 We  begin  with  this
hypothesis  in order to (a) illustrate our methodology in an intuitive setting;  and (b) set the stage
for a further test of the role of financial institutions in the resource allocation process.
To test this  'modified Chenery hypothesis'  we use the model  given  in (4),  substituting
f(Xc,  Xd)=  Iiog(Incomec)  - log(Incomed)l.  We predict  a negative  value for a, so that countries
that  are  closer  in  development,  as  measured  by  per  capita  income,  have  more  correlated
industrial growth rates. In Table 2, we observe  that the co-movement in industry growth (i.e. our
correlation  measure)  and  distance  in GDP  are negatively  correlated  with coefficient  of  -0.3,
significant  at  1% (Panel B).  Graphically,  we illustrate  this relationship  in two  ways.  As a first
step, we show in Figure 3, Panel A the relationship between distance in income and correlation
in growth rates for each country paired with the United States. The data show a strong negative
correlation:  the regression coefficient is -0.99 with a t-statistic of  -6.7 and R2 of 0.46.  In Panel
B,  Figure 3 we presents a similar graph, for all pairs of countries.
15 The theory linking patterns of growth to income levels is  straightforward:  on the demand side, different industries
will have differential  elasticities with respect to per capita income, because of differences in income elasticities of
demand across goods.  Taking into account backward linkages, different intermediate goods will also be required at
different stages of development,  further reinforcing the differential elasticities  across sectors.  There are also supply
side stories that could generate this relationship.  Suppose that countries and industries are governed by a standard
AK technology, but that countries differ in terms of their A's, depending on their factor endowments.  Imagine
furthermore that there is a technological shock where countries  are differentially affected in terms of their abilities to
take advantage of  the innovation; this will affect countries more similarly if they have similar factor endowments,
and hence a more similar distribution of A's.
19Finally,  before  continuing,  we note that in our regressions,  an econometric  issue  arises,
because  of the use of dyadic  data:  because  each country  appears N - 1 times  in the data,  it is
probably  not  appropriate  to  assume  independence  of  the  error  terms  in  equation  (13).16
Techniques  to  deal with this issue  have already  been developed  by social  network researchers.
In particular,  we utilize the  non-parametric  quadratic  assignment  procedure  (QAP)  to calculate
significance (Baker and Hubert,  1981; Krackhardt,  1988). 17
Table 4  shows  our main  results  on the  relationship  between  similarity  in  income  and
correlations  in industry growth  rates for all pairs of countries.  We  find strong support  for  the
modified Chenery hypothesis: countries that are closer in per capita income have industry growth
patterns  that are more highly correlated.  Using the QAP method for calculating standard  errors,
we  find that the  coefficient  on  Ilog(Incomej) - log(Incomed)l  is  significant  at  the  one percent
level.  Its size implies that countries that are twice  as close in per capita income (equal  to one
standard deviation;  a =1.13  ) will have  a correlation  of industry growth rates  that is higher by
0.10.  We  add various other measures of development distance metrics  as regressors  in models
(2)  - (7).  Additional  covariates  include  measures  of:  corruption  (as  a  summary  statistic  of
legal/institution distance), education,  accounting standards, population (to proxy for market size),
legal  origin,  similarity  in income  distributions  measured by the  similarity in Gini  coefficients,
and  two  measures  of trade.  These  trade  measures  include  one ('trade  openness')  that reflects
similarity  in the  total level of trade  (exports  +  imports)  as percent of GDP,  and a  second that
16 For example, if E
6 d and Sde  are both large, our priors would be that szc  would be large as well.
'7 QAP is in essence a Bootstrap procedure which preserves interdependencies  between rows and columns.
Repeating this procedure  N times generates a distribution of coefficients under the null of  no relationship.  The
reported percentiles correspond to the place of the actual coefficient in this sampling distribution.  The percentiles
below 2.5% and above 97.5% represent significance  at 5%  level. The results reported in the paper used  1000
repetitions.  We thank Bill Simpson for kindly providing us with his STATA routines to implement the QAP.  Note
that QAP uniformly increases  standard errors reported in this paper.  All t-statistics are much higher using the usual
robust standard errors.
20measures the total trade flows between two countries in a pair as a percent of the sum of the two
countries'  GDP. We find that only IGini Coefficientl and the trade measures are significant at the
five percent  level or  greater,  using the QAP bootstrapped  standard  errors.  The most important
result  of this  table  is  that  the  significance  of IGDPI  is  unaffected  by the  inclusion  of these
covariates.
3.3  Financial Development  and Correlated Patterns of Growth
In  this  section  we  test  our  primary  hypothesis  that  well-developed  financial  markets  are
necessary to take  advantage  of growth opportunities.  As was discussed in section  1 we assume
that there  exist global  shocks to  growth opportunities  in particular industries  that are common
across all countries.  Since responses to a global shock are dependent  on a high level of financial
development,  growth rates will move together only if both countries have high levels of financial
development.  Intuitively, if one of the countries in a pair does not have well-developed  financial
institutions, its growth rate will be randomly distributed, i.e., dictated by the error term  ecc.  8 We
implement this idea by considering Min(FDj,FDj) as a regressor to explain correlations in growth
rates.
We test this hypothesis  by estimating a model that incorporates  both a distance measure
of per  capita  income  (as  suggested by  our regressions  in  the previous  section),  as  well  as  a
minimum measure of financial development:
Corr(Growthic,Growthid)  = a + 01*1log(Incomej)  - log(Incomed)l  +
18 In other words, without the developed financial markets only firms/industries  that do not need extemal finance
will be growing.  These firms will be either ones generating  high cash flows (relative to their investment needs) or
those that have an access  to insider equity (for example family owned firms that do not rely on formal financial
markets for their "extemal"  financing requirements).
21P2*Min(FDc,FDd)  + Ecd
These results are reported in Table 5,  utilizing various measures of financial  development.  We
find that when FD  is measured  as Domestic  Credit,  its coefficient  is  significant  at 2%  (using
QAP  percentiles).  However  if  FD  is  measured  as  market  capitalization,  P2  is  no  longer
significant.19 Finally, our measure of Private Bank Credit is significant at 1%. Thus, if we accept
that  there  is  some  component  of growth  opportunities  that  is  common  across  countries,  our
results provide  support  for the hypothesis  that well-developed  financial  institutions  (at  least in
the  form  of private  sector  banking  institutions)  allow  firms  to  better take  advantage  of these
opportunities.
This baseline  specification  suffers from a potential  omitted variable bias: it may be that
Min(FDC,FDd)  is simply picking up the fact that growth rates are only correlated if  both countries
are rich, i.e., growth opportunities are more correlated in generally well-developed countries,  but
not  in  underdeveloped  countries.20 One  way  of  examining  this  possibility  is  to  include
Min(log(Income),log(Incomed))  as  an independent  variable.  We add this variable  in model  (5)
and find that it takes a significantly positive coefficient,  indicating that pairs of well-developed
countries  have  higher  co-movement  in  industrial  growth patterns.  We then  add this  measure
along  with  our two  measures  of FD  that  were  significant  on  their  own  - DOMCRED  and
PRIVCRED.  They both remain significant (although the coefficient on min(DOMCRED)  is now
significant at 6%, while min(PRIVCRED) remains significant at 1%).  However Min(GDP) is no
19  There are two extreme outliers in the Market Capitalization index:  South Africa and Singapore; when we exclude
them in the model (3), the coefficient becomes weakly significant according to the t-test but not significant
according to the QAP bootstrapped percentile method.  We have also experimented with different measures of stock
market development  which included turnover and value trade to GDP which were not significant.
20 This would simply reflect a different functional form for the Income-Growth Pattern relationship.  To rephrase
Tolstoy, All well-functioning  economies are alike; every dysfunctional economy is dysfunction in its own way.
22longer  significant  at  conventional  levels.21  Finally,  in  columns  (6)  and  (7)  we  add  the  two
measures  of trade  flows  as  potential omitted  variables  that  are  correlated  with both  financial
development  and  the  comovement  in  growth  rates,  and  find that  the  coefficient  on Min(FD)
remains  significant.  Thus, we find  support for our theory of Finance  and Development,  which
does not seem to be explained by a simple omitted variable problem.
Interactions of  Growth Opportunities  and Financial  Development
In our initial set of regressions  (Table  5) we assumed that there was some component of growth
opportunities  that  was  common  across  all  countries  (commonalities).  In  our  final  set  of
regressions  below,  we  will take  advantage  of a model  that suggests  systematic similarities in
growth  opportunities,  and  use  this  to  look  for  systematic  similarities  in  growth  patterns  in
countries  that are  financially well-developed.  In particular,  recall that our revised statement of
Chenery's hypothesis posits that the reason that countries  at similar levels of per capita income
have  more  similar patterns  of industrial  development  is  that they  have  more  similar  demand
structures.  Essentially, this  says  that growth opportunities  should be more  similar in countries
that are closer together in terms of per capita income.  However, if our Finance and Development
theory holds, firms will be able to take advantage of the similar opportunities, only if a country is
at  a  sufficiently  high  level  of  financial  development.  This  implies  that  the  interaction,
Min(PRIVCRED,,PRIVCREDd)*jlog(Incomec)  - log(Incomed)l,  should be negative.  We report
21 It is important to recognize  the alternative hypothesis that could produce the results discussed above. Imagine that
the ratio of the variance of the global shocks relative to the country-specific  shocks is systematically related to the
country's  level of development. That is, if countries  with low level of development have high variance of the
country-specific  shocks relative to the global shocks,  we will not observe any strong response of growth to the
global shocks (i.e. growth will respond to country-specific  shocks).  However, by including the minimum level of
income (a measure of the overall development)  we control for such systematic  differences,  if they exist and still find
that our result on financial development to be robust.
23the results of this interaction in Table 7.  As predicted,  the coefficient on this interaction term is
negative and significant at 5%  for our preferred measure of financial development, PRIVCRED.
To  summarize,  we report  evidence  that is  supportive of the  Finance  and Development
view of resource allocation;  we also find that private banking assets are particularly important in
this regard.  It is worth emphasizing  at this point how we have identified  this effect,  since we
never  actually observe industry  growth  opportunities  directly.  In our initial set of regressions
(Table  5)  we assume  that  there is  some  component  of growth  opportunities  that was common
across  all  countries  (commonalities).  In  the  final  set  of results  we  assume  that  there  are
systematic similarities  in growth opportunities and that these growth opportunities are correlated
with similarity in development,  as measured by per capita income.
3.4 Similarity in Financial Development  and External Dependence
In  this  section,  we  consider  an  alternative  hypothesis  on  the  relationship  between  financial
development and growth, as suggested by RZ.  While RZ emphasize  that differences in external
financing needs may be driven by global shocks to demand, as is our focus, they also discuss the
possibility that certain  industries have an inherent need  for outside financing,  for technological
reasons.  This may be justified on the basis of differential  needs for financing at different points
in an industry's  life cycle, and also differences in initial project scale requirements  and gestation
periods
According to  this alternative  'financial  dependence'  hypothesis,  there are  global shocks
to  growth  in different  industries;  if these  shocks  are to  industries  with high  outside  financing
needs, these industries will grow only in countries with strong financial institutions.  This implies
that countries with well-developed financial markets will grow relatively more in industries with
24high financial dependence;  symmetrically,  countries with underdeveloped  financial markets will
grow  relatively  more  in  low  financial  dependence  industries.22 In  our  formulation,  this
hypothesis  suggests  that  similarity in  financial  development  should  be  predictive  of sectoral
correlation:  high  FD  countries  should  specialize  in  industries  with  high external  dependence,
while low FD countries should grow in industries with low external dependence,  i.e.,
Corr(Growth 1 C,Growthid) = a + PI*IFDc - FDdI  + 
5cd
When we run these regressions with the same controls  as in Table  7, none of the various
measures of financial development  yields a statistically significant coefficient.  We therefore  do
not find evidence  in support of this 'financial dependence'  view of finance and development.
This section further  highlights the  advantage  of our methodology:  we argue  that the RZ
model given in (3) cannot differentiate between the 'financial  dependence'  view, just described,
and the  'growth opportunities'  view that is the main focus of our paper.  To further illustrate this
point, we repeat our basic regressions  on the  correlation  of growth rates, limiting  country-pair
comparisons  only to those involving the United States, i.e.,  a total of 42 observations.  Table  8
shows that both Min(FDc,FDus)  and  IFD,  - FDusI  yield qualitatively  very similar results when
the  sample  is  limited  to  U.S.  pairwise  comparisons,  in  sharp  contrast  to  the  differences  that
emerge  when we  utilize  the  full  sample,  in  which  case  only  the  Min(FDc,FDus)  measure  is
significant,  as  in our previous.results.  This is not surprising  since,  given that the U.S. is a high
FD country,  Min(FDc,FDus)  a  +  13*IFDc  - FDusl.  In  the context  of our methodology,  these
22 This implication follows only if one assumes that the external financing needs are the same (at least relatively  if
not in levels)  for industries in all countries during the time period in this study. In other words, this assunption
required  to produce this implication is that industries that have  low dependence on external finance are the same  in
all countries.
25regressions  are  the  closest  analog  to  those  of RZ.  Thus,  an  additional  advantage  of our
methodology is that by making the full set of pairwise comparisons,  we are able to  differentiate
among  alternative  development  metrics,  i.e.  similarity  in  development  vs.  high  level  of
development in both countries.
4.  Conclusions  and Implications
In this paper, we  extend  the  literature  on finance and development,  by presenting  a heretofore
unutilized technique for examining the intersectoral  allocation of resources across countries.  We
argue that this technique is both more efficient in its use of available data, and also allows for the
more refined testing of hypotheses than previous methods that have been utilized in research in
finance.  Furthermore,  our  approach  does  not  require  that  we  actually  observe  growth
opportunities:  we  are  able  to  identify  the  finance  and  growth  hypothesis  by  looking  at
commonalities and differences in growth opportunities  across countries.
In terms of our results, we find strong support for the 'finance and growth opportunities'
view of financial  institutions:  countries  have  correlated  intersectoral  growth rates  only if both
countries  have  well-developed  financial  markets.  The  high  correlation  results  because  only
industries  in  countries  with  well-functioning  financial  systems  can  effectively  respond  to
common shocks to their growth opportunities, which reinforces the role of financial development
in channeling the resources to their most productive uses. By contrast, we do not find support for
the 'external dependence'  view of financial institutions, according to which some industries have
an inherent need for outside financing,  and that countries  with well-developed  financial markets
are better positioned  to take  advantage  of opportunities  in  these markets.  This  is an important
26finding,  as  the  results of RZ have  at times  been misinterpreted  to imply that a  country should
choose to specialize in particular industries,  depending on its level of financial development.  We
also find  evidence that  suggests  that private  financial  institutions  are better able  to respond to
growth opportunities, as we find that measures of financial development  that reflect the presence
of private  sector  banking  institutions  perform  better than  previously  used  measures  of total
credit.
While  our  results  are  quite  robust  statistically,  we  are  currently  investigating  several
avenues  of further  research  that  will  allow  us  to  examine  these  ideas  using  microdata.  In
particular,  by looking at resource allocations before and after banking privatizations, we hope to
provide  more  direct  evidence  on  the  role  of private  sector  banking  institutions.  Also,  by
examining  the  investment  patterns  of multinational  vs.  domestic  firms,  we  hope  to  further
understand the role of local financing  constraints  as a potential impediment  to the allocation of
capital to high growth areas.
Finally,  we  are  also  working  on  several  extensions  that  will  take  advantage  of the
temporal dimension of our data, by looking at how correlations change over time, to examine the
impact of increased  globalization,  and business cycles  effects  on intra-industry  growth.  It may
also  be  possible  to  study  regional  co-movement  (using  concordance  coefficients  instead  of
correlations), to further understand the allocative  effects of economic integration.
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29Figure 1: Minimum vs. Distance Measures.
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Please  see  equation  (13)  in  the  text  for  a definition  of a, and  an explanation  of the  figures.
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31Figure 3. Distance in income  levels  and correlation of  industrial growth patterns.
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32Figure 3. (continued)
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0  0  % ,  0  0  0  0  33Table 1. Variable Definitions and Sources.
Abbreviation  Description
Industry-level variables.
EXTFIN  Dependence  on extemal financing,  industry-level  median of the ratio of capital expenditures
minus cash flow over capital expenditures (the numerator  and denominator  are summed  over
all years for each firm  before  dividing) for US.  This variable  measures the  portion  of capital
expenditures not financed by intemally generated cash.  From Rajan and Zingales (1998).
USGrowth  Growth  In real  sales,  industry-level  median  of firm average  growth  rages over 1980-1990 for
US firms, from Compustat.
Industry growth  Annual  compounded growth  rate  in real  value added  estimated  for the period  1980-1990 for
each ISIC industry in each country From  Rajan and Zingales (1998).
Country-level variables:
Domestic credit  Ratio  of domestic  credit  held  by  monetary  authorities  and  depositary  institutions  (excluding
interbank  deposits)  scaled  by  GDP  for  1980.  Original  source  is  Intemational  Financial
Statistics (IFS).
Market cap.  Ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP in 1980. IFS.
Log GDP PC  Log of GDP per capita in US dollars in 1980. IFS
Private Bank Credit  Domestic  Credit provided by non-governmental  financial institutions, calculated  using average
percent of assets held by private banks over 1970 and 1995  from La Porta et al. (2001)
Legal origin  Dummies for English,  French, German  or Scandinavian origin of the legal system.  La Porta et
al.  (1996).  Variable  'same  legal origin"  equals to one if both  countries  come from  the same
legal origin and zero otherwise.
Accounting Standards  Amount of disclosure of company's  annual reports in each countries. La Porta et al.(1996)
Education  Percentage  of  population  receiving  secondary  school  education,  1980.  From  Rajan  and
Zingales (1998)
Corruption  ICRG  Measure of corruption;  higher number indicates lower corruption.
Measures calculated on Dairs of countries:
Correlation  Correlation over all industries in Industry Growth  (described above) for all pair of countries.
| X |  Absolute Distance in variable X for each pair of countries (ij) defined  as I  X(i-Xo) I
Min (X)  Minimum  value in  variable X for each pair of countries (i,j)  defined  as Min(X(i),XO))
34Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
See Table  1 for Variable  Definitions  and  Sources.  All variables  are calculated  for  each pair of
countries  using formulas  given in Table  1. Numnbers  in [ ] in the  first row show the number of
Industries used in calculating the correlation for each pair of countries.
Panel  A. Descriptive Statistics
N obs.  Min  Mean  Median  Max  Std.
Correlation  861  -0.647  0.096  0.092  0.796  .27
[6]  [26]  [27]  [37]  [9]
Log GDP PC I  861  0.002  1.537  1.354  4.780  1.13
IDomestic Credit  861  0.001  0.260  0.216  0.841  0.19
l  Market Capitalization I  861  0.000  0.281  0.144  1.624  0.36
I  Private Bank Credit j  861  0.000  0.237  0.197  0.964  0.19
Min (Log GDP PC)  861  4.793  7.137  7.047  9.505  1.24
Min (Domestic Credit)  861  0.162  0.395  0.378  0.990  0.15
Min (Market Capitalization)  861  0.000  0.080  0.052  1.203  0.11
Min (Private Bank Credit)  861  0.005  0.182  0.137  0.771  0.14
35Panel  B. Correlations
I  Private I  Min  Min
IDom.  I  I  Marketl  I  Bank  I  Min  (Dom.  (Market
Correlation  I  GDPPCI  I  Creditl  I  Cap.  I  I  Credit  I  (GDP PC)  Credit)  Cap.)
GDP PCI  -0.31*
(0)
Domestic Credit 1-0.06  0.04
(0.08)  (022)
1  Market
Capitalizationl  0.05  -0.08*  -0.08*
0.15  0.01  0.02
| Private Bank  40.08*  0.26*  0.41 *  -0.03
Credit I  (0.01)  (0)  (0)  (0.32)
Min (GDP PC)  0.32*  -0.71*  0.05  0.08*  -0.08*
(0)  (0)  (0.15)  (0.01)  (0)
Min (Dom.  0.22*  -0.15*  -0.26*  -0.12*  0.06  0.35*
Credit)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0.8)  (0)
Min (Market  0.05  -0.17*  -0.08*  0.12*  -0.09*  0.27*  0.08*
Capitalization)  (0.11)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0.001)  (0)  (0.02)
Min (Private Bank0.31*  -0.35*  -0.03  0.11*  -0.24*  0.61*  0.52*  0.43*
Credit)  (0)  (0)  (0.36)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)
36Table 3. Industry Growth and Financial Dependence  Revisited
Dependent variable is real growth in value added for each industry in each country.  Fraction is
fraction of industry Value Added in total manufacturing in 1980, EXTFIN is industry median
financial dependence,  both from RZ. USGrowth is real sales growth in US, industry median of
firm averages over 1980-1989  from Compustat.  FD is the sum of domestic credit and market
capitalization  scaled by GDP for 1980.  All models include country and industry dummies.
Standard errors appear in parentheses, and are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.  Significance levels
** and * correspond to 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
(1)  (2)  (3)
Fraction  -0.91***  -0.91***  -0.91***
(0.25)  (0.25)  (0.25)
EXTFIN*FD  0.069***  0.019
(0.023)  (0.025)
USGrowth*FD  0.99***  0.84**
(0.33)  (0.39)
N Obs  1217  1217  1217
RP  0.29  0.29  0.29
37Table 4. Co-movement  in Growth rates and Distance  in Income
Dependent variable is Correlation in Growth rates across all industries for each pair of countries.
Constant is included in all regressions (not reported).  T-statistics are in (  and Bootstrapped
Percentile (using QAP Procedure  described in text) in [], percentiles below 2.5% or above 97.5%
represent significance at 5% level.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
Distance in:
Log GDP PC l  -0.074  -0.06  -0.07  -0.07  -0.079  -0.067  -0.075  -0.075  -0.063
(-9.65)  (-5.5)  (-5.8)  (-8.9)  (-9.2)  (-8.9)  (-9.7)  (-9.9)  (7.8)
[0%]  [0%]  [0%]  [0%]  [0%]  [0%]  [0%]  [0%]  [0%]




Standards I  (59)]
I  Log of  0.002
Population  (0.3)
[54%]




Coefficient I  (-4)
[2%]
Same Legal  -0.009
C)rigin  (-0.5)
[36%]
l Trade  -0.022
Opennessl  (3.5)
[9-9%]
Total Trade  9.85
Flows  (3.1)
[100%]
N Obs  861  861  561  820  820  861  861  861  820
R2  0.094  0.10  0.06  0.085  0.092  0.11  0.095  0.10  0.11
38Table 5. Co-movement in Growth rates and Level  of Financial Development
Dependent variable is Correlation in Growth rates across all industries  for each pair of countries.
Model 3 excludes  South Africa and Singapore which are outliers on Market Capitalization.
Constant is included in all regressions  (not reported). T-statistics  are in 0 and Bootstrapped
Percentile (using QAP Procedure described in text) in [], percentiles below 2.5% or above 97.5%
represent significance  at 5%  level.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
I  Log GDP  -0.067  -0.074  -0.074  -0.055  -0.038  -0.045  -0.048  -0.054  -0.049
PC  (-8.8)  (-9.5)  (-9.5)  (-6.8)  (-3.5)  (-4.1)  (4.3)  (-6.5)  (-6.06)
[0%]  [0%]  [0%]  [0%]  [2.5%]  [0.8%]  [0.7%]  [0%]  [0%]
Min  0.31  0.25
(Domestic  (5.5)  (4.4)
Credit)  [99%]  [97%]
Min (Market  0.004  0.11
Cap.)  (0.03)  (2.1)
[56%]  [77%]
Min (Private  0.44  0.40  0.45  0.36
Bank Credit)  (7.3)  (5.6)  (7.5)  (5.53)
[99.8%]  [99%]  [99.8%]  [99.4%]
Min (Log  0.044  0.029  0.01
GDP PC)  (4.3)[9  (2.7)  (0.9)
9%]  [91%]  [64%]
I  Trade  -0.024
Openness I  (-3.76)
[6.4%]
Trade Flows  7.71
(2.92)
[99.8%]
N Obs  861  861  780  861  861  861  861  861  820
R2  0.13  0.095  0.11  0.14  0.12  0.13  0.14  0.15  0.14
39Table 6. Interaction Of Financial Development  and Minimum in GNP PC
Dependent variable is Correlation in Growth rates across all industries for each pair of countries.
Constant is included in all regressions. T-statistics are in 0 and Bootstrapped Percentile (using
QAP Procedure described in text) in [], percentiles below 2.5% or above 97.5% represent
significance at 5% level.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Log GDP PC |  -0.023  -0.077  -0.026  -0.028  -0.029
(-1.2)  (-7.9)  (-2.5)  (-2.71)  (2.75)
[27%]  [0%]  [10%]  [9%]  [8.5%]
Min (Domestic Credit)  0.47
(4.7)
[99.7%]
Min (Market Capitalization)  -0.07
(-0.3)
[38%]
Min (Private Bank Credit)  0.7  0.71  0.59
(7.9)  (7.9)  (6.24)
[100%]  [100%]  [99.5%]
Interactions:
I  Log GDP PC j * Min(Domestic  -0.11
Credit)  (2.2)
[7.9%]
Log GDP PC  * Min(Market Cap.)  0.059
(0.6)
[66%]
I  Log GDP PC I  * Min(Private Bank  -0.19  -0.18  -0.15
Credit)  (4.1)  (3.99)  (3.06)
[2.2%]  [3%]  [5.9%]
Trade Openness I  -0.024
(3.67)
[7%]
Total Trade Flows  6.84
(3.13)
[99.7%]
N Obs  861  861  861  861  820
R2 0.13  0.095  0.15  0.17  0.14
40Table 7. Co-movement  in Growth rates and Distance in Financial Development
Dependent variable is Correlation in Growth rates across all industries for each pair of countries.
Constant is included in all regressions (not reported).  T-statistics are in 0 and Bootstrapped
Percentile (using QAP Procedure described in text)  in [], percentiles below 2.5% or above
97.5% represent significance at 5% level.
(1)  (2)  (3)
Log GDP PC j  -0.074  -0.074  -0.074
(-9.6)  (-9.6)  (-9.1)
[0%]  [0%]  [0%]
Domestic Credit I  -0.065
(1.4)
[19%]
I Market Capitalization I  0.02
(0.7)
[61%]
I  Private Bank Credit I  -0.006
(0.1)
[45%]
N Obs  861  861  861
R'  0.096  0.096  0.095
41Table 8. Minimum vs. Distance - all pairs vs. pairs with US
US only  Full Sample
Min(FD)  IFDI  Min(FD  IFDI
Coefficient  0.47  -0.50  0.22  -0.026
(0.12)  (0.15)  (0.037)  (0.026)
N obs  41  41  861  861
R2  0.23  0.23  0.001  0.04
42Appendix A. Simple model of Growth and External Financing.
Consider a standard model of profit maximization:
Max  rI  (K)-rK
K
Where K is the capital stock, which is the only input into the production function  rI (K), r is the
interest  (or leasing)  rate,  there  is  no  depreciation  and  price  of output  is  normalized  to  one.
Assume  simple  Cobb-Douglas  production  function:  1r  (K)= OKa  with  decreasing  returns  to
scale,  so that a<l. Here, an increase in the "technology" parameter 0  is equivalent to an increase
in growth opportunities.
We then have the FOC:
r =a0KCI =a rT(K)/K
This is  familiar relationship  that  equates  marginal  cost of capital  to  its marginal  benefits.  We
furither assume that initially,  the firm is operating at the optimal capital stock, and that there  are
no barriers to entry.  Thus, profits are zero, and:
K * = ( aS ) l-
In this model, new growth opportunities are  equivalent to increase in parameter 0 . The increase
in desired capital stock (i.e. the level of investment) will then be given by:
aK  1  1I
-=(  -)-K a8  I-a) 
We can rewrite the revenue function at the optimal capital stock as
ri(K*)=  K*
a
Cash Flow (revenue minus interest expenses) will then be given by:
r  .1~~-a
CF(K)  = ri(K*)  - rK*  =-K - rK  = rK (-)
a  a
43It is easy to see that if a >  r  , which represent reasonable parameter values,23
1-a  8CF(K*)  I-a  aK*  aK
r-<  1, and hence  r-a  <  -
a  89  a  8a  89
That  is,  an  increase  in cash  flows  will be  less  than  the  desired investment  and  therefore  will
require external  financing. The amount of external  financing  required is directly proportional  to
the growth in capital stock:
=aK  aCF(K)  1-a) aK
EXTEIN--=  --  (l-  r  _
89  89  a  89
Since in this simple model new investment is proportional  to growth  (i.e. increase  in the capital
stock),  it follows immediately that EXTFIN = c*GROWTH.
23 It is reasonable  to assume the curvature parameter a to be above 0.5; and the interest rate well below this level.
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